The Missouri Supreme Court in Swadley v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., 513 S.W.3d 355 (Mo. 2017) held that UIM coverage did not apply when the underinsured motorist had liability coverage limits greater than the insured's underinsured motorist limits. Previously, the Missouri Court of Appeals had explained the purpose of UIM coverage. "The purpose of underinsured motorist coverage is to provide insurance coverage for insureds who have been bodily injured by a negligent motorist whose own automobile liability insurance coverage is insufficient to pay for the injured person's actual damages." Wasson v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., 358 S.W. 3d 113, 117 (Mo. App. 2011).
The Indiana Court of Appeals in Walsh Construction Co. v. Zurich American Insurance Co. 2017 WL 1151033 (IN Ct App March 28th 2017) acknowledged that under Indiana law in situations that arise between the insurer and the named insured, the insurer's responsibility is to defend and indemnify the named insured only after the SIR has been satisfied and exhausted. However, the question of whether a SIR endorsement applied only to the insurers relationship to the named insured or whether it also applied to an additional insured was resolved in the Walsh case as a question of first impression.
Recently the Colorado Supreme Court in American Family Mutual Ins. Co. v. Hansen, 2016 WL 3398507 (Colo., filed 6/20/16) considered whether an extrinsic document, separate and apart from the insurance policy, could be used to create a policy ambiguity. The Court held that the trial court and the Colorado Court of Appeals erred when it considered the extrinsic document to create a coverage ambiguity. The Colorado Supreme Court held that the discrepancy in an extrinsic document did not create an ambiguity in the policy because the ambiguity doctrine can only be used to determine whether an ambiguity exists within the four corners of the insurance policy itself and cannot be created by an extrinsic document that was not part of that policy.
Florida Appellate Court rules that an insurance policy's anti-assignment clause did not prohibit an insured from assigning policy proceeds to a contractor that the insured hired to repair the insured's property following a loss.